



The truth about e-skills
1. Introduction
When compared to other technological breakthroughs, information and communication
technologies (ICT) appear to have at least two unique features. One is the long, unremitting
technological improvement that has taken place in these technologies during the post-war period.
A second unique feature is the exceptional technological spillovers that are possible throughout the
economy.
This paper addresses the particular question of the impact of this "new" digital environment on the
labour market. It will investigate in particular how ICT has changed and is changing the labour
market and the "old", classical insights into the relationship between technology, employment and
skills. We start in Section 2 with a review of the literature on technology and employment. In
previous centuries, but also in recent decades, new technologies were often identified with
employment "destruction". They were feared to be one of the main causes of unemployment
amongst unskilled workers and at the origin of most of the new, so-called "biased" opportunities
in favour for more skilled workers. Ever since the so-called Luddites smashed the power looms and
spinning jennies that threatened their livelihood in the early 19th century, the popular fear that
technological change would increase unemployment has existed and continued even in boom
years.
We do not review the currently available evidence surrounding employment growth in Europe and
its relationship with the "new" economy. We rather focus here on the skill aspects of the emerging
new ICT. These remain controversial, and too often represent an area of meaningless "policy
speak".
There is little doubt that most of thejobs being "displaced" as a result of the application of new ICT
have been concentrated amongst the lower skilled workforce, whereas many of the new jobs have
required, different, sometimes new (or higher), levels of skills. Hence, as the demand for skilled
labour has risen relative to the demand for unskilled labour, wage differentials have widened in
favour of the higher educated. For example, it is often cited that since 1979, the average weekly
earnings of college graduates in the United States have risen by more than 30 percent relative to
those of high-school graduates (e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1992). As average real wages rose relatively
slowly for much of this period, the real pay of the least educated has actually fallen in the United
States over the past 20 years.
Section 3 addresses the computer as the particular prominent example of this process. However, it
does not appear to be computer skills per se that have particularly led to increasing demand for
skilled labour. In this regard, Acemoglu (1998), and Goldin and Katz (1998), suggest that although
ICT must have played a part in the widening of wage inequality over the past two decades, slower
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growth in the supply of more educated workers may have been a bigger factor (1). This evidence
leads us to review (in Section 4) international data on skill levels to investigate further the differences
across countries and the consequences for wages. Following this analysis, we conjecture that the
ultimate effect of the computer is to free time for the core tasks of a particular job. This will induce
employers to hire more skilled workers.
Concluding, we highlight some features of the current impact of ICT on growth and employment. So far
the rapid diffusion of the information communication revolution has been accompanied at the aggregate
level, with a predominance of new employment opportunities: in sectors predicted to witness significant
employment displacement such as the telecom or financial services sector. But this current pattern gives
no guarantees as to future sectoral employment trends. The only clear indication seems to be that
demand satiation is more than ever not a factor bringing about technological unemployment.
2. New technology and employment
The relationship between technology, growth and employment has been the subject of a large
literature in economics. We would distinguish four sets of economic debate on the relationship
between technology and employment. The first, and most "classical" in its origins, took place during
the economic depression of the 1930s. The second debate focused mainly on the post-war United
States and the fear of "automation". In the 1960s, levels of unemployment were higher in the United
States than in Europe, and many people blamed technological change. As a result, a National
Commission on Automation was appointed and produced a massive six-volume report in 1966. The
third debate, which began in the late 1970s, was particularly active in Europe. It focused on the
emergence of the combination of computer-based communication, information, and automation
techniques associated with microelectronics. These appeared at first glance to have great labour-
displacing implications. The fear was that these displacement effects might dominate the
compensating job creation effects for quite some time. As with the classical debate, this was a
reflection of the times: there was a set of "revolutionary" new technologies and persisting high
unemployment. The fourth, and most recent, upsurge in this debate focuses more on the global
aspects of ICT, and the possible erosion of employment and living standards in the advanced
countries. Originating mainly in the United States, and linked to the political debate surrounding
NAFTA, it quickly "globalised", and spread throughout the world (2).
While the subject of intense argument over the last two centuries, the relationship between technical
change and employment appears straightforward today, at least from the macroeconomic
perspective. Either the introduction of new technologies leads to more efficient production
processes, reducing costs by saving on labour, capital, materials, energy, or any other factor of
production, or it leads more directly to the development of new products that generate new
demand. In either case, more welfare is created: in the first scenario through more efficient
production that liberates scarce input resources; in the second case by satisfying new wants. The
impact is often a mixture of both effects.
T) In the 1970s, the supply of educated workers surged in America as the baby-boom generation entered the workforce and
college enrolment rose. But since then, the educational level of the workforce has improved much more slowly A comparison
made by Murphy, Riddell and Romer (1998), of the United States with Canada supports this argument. During the 1980s
and 1990s the ratio between the earnings of university graduates and high-school graduates rose sharply in the United
States, but fell in Canada. In both countries the demand for skilled labour rose by similar margins, but the supply of educated
workers rose much more rapidly in Canada than in the United States.
2) See Freeman and Soete (1994), and Soete (1987), for an overview of this latter fear.
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depends on the extent to which firms translate productivity gains into lower prices and new
investment, and the pace with which consumers respond to lower prices in terms of greater demand.
The job losses that might follow the introduction of a new labour-saving process are compensated
by the job creation associated with output growth (following the decline in prices), by additional
employment creation in other sectors (and particularly in the new technology-supplying sector), and
by the possible substitution of labour for capital (following a downward wage adjustment that clears
the labour market). As long as there are unsatisfied needs in the economy and as long as labour
and product markets are sufficiently flexible, technological change, even in the form of new labour-
saving production processes, does not reduce aggregate employment.
Most of the controversies that have dominated the economics literature on this issue over the last
decades have centred on the automatic nature of the various compensation effects described
above. Since the functioning and flexibility of product markets depends in part on the firm's market
power, the degree of economies of scale and various other factors influencing prices, many
contributors have questioned the way in which cost reductions are effectively translated into lower
prices and are likely to lead to more output growth. Similar questions can be raised with respect to
employment growth and the functioning of labour markets; they range from downward wage
inflexibility to the many mismatches typical of (heterogeneous) labour markets. In either case, it is
less technology itself that is at the centre of the debate than the pace and clearing function of
product and labour markets. The relevant policy issues therefore fall primarily under the heading of





Other contributions have questioned the possibility of ex-post substitution between labour and other
factors of production. At least in the short term, the implications of a more rigid set of production
coefficients for analysing technical change and employment are relatively straightforward. Labour-
saving technological change embodied in new investment could, if wages adjust slowly, lead to
unemployment because of insufficient investment to maintain full-employment; this is the so-called
"capital-shortage" unemployment. There was a lively debate during the 1980s on the extent to
which the increase in unemployment in European countries could be due to this phenomenon.
Yet other contributions question the automatic nature of the link between input-saving new
technologies and productivity gains. Most of these studies were empirically focused and attempted
to find reasonable explanations for the disappointing performance of total factor productivity
growth in most OECD countries during the late 1970s and 1980s, despite rapid investment in
knowledge (in particular, in private sector R&D) and the emergence of the new combination of ICT.
The international "open economy" framework within which most compensation mechanisms are likely
to operate, complicates, however, matters greatly. Relatively straightforward linkages between
technology, productivity growth, and job creation such as those mentioned above no longer exist.
Even the most simple elaboration in terms of employment compensation due to foreign demand (e.g.
through export and import elasticities) leads to complex interactions (Stoneman, 1984). More
3) The OECD Jobs Study (1994) can be said to have focused primarily on labour markets emphasising in particular the poor
functioning of labour markets in Europe, compared to the US; the McKinsey Global Institute study (1994) on the functioning
of product markets.
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on productivity growth or international capital mobility, make it much more difficult to identify the key
links between the introduction of a new technology and the ensuing domestic employment impact.
The focus of some of the recent popular concerns about the implications of technological change
for employment appear to relate to the way that gains from technological change are distributed
internationally. In the gloomy vision of some popular authors, (4)
"...wages in the most advanced economies are being eroded owing to the
emergence of a global market-place where low-paid workers compete for the
few jobs created by footloose global corporations" . (Rifkin, 1995).
In other words, the globalisation of industry and services casts a new light on the interaction
between technology and employment in an open economic framework characterised by low
transport and communication costs.
The impaet on individual
countries is difficult to
predict and depends upon




While it is still generally agreed that in a "world" economic framework, input-saving technical
change leads, through increases in productivity, to growth and new employment, the impact on
individual countries is difficult to predict and depends on a broad range of macroeconomic and
microeconomic adjustment mechanisms (e.g. Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2000 and Berman, 2000).
This is especially true because positive and negative effects do not coincide either in time or in
space: adjustment takes time, and the industries and types of workers that will benefit from technical
change are different from the ones that lose from it.
At the same time, the premium placed on the role of knowledge and on the acquisition of skills in this
global environment implies that international differences in the pattern of employment and
unemployment depends increasingly on the capacity of national economies to innovate, enter new,
unregulated service sectors and/or absorb new technology more rapidly. The emergence of a so-called
information society becomes hence crucially dependent on user demand for new information products
and services. The "demand articulation" of the latter depends on the existing regulatory institutional
framework as well as on the overall macroeconomic climate. Much had already been written about the
former. Many studies point e.g. to the existing (over)regulation in Europe in a number of "information
society" service sectors. Moreover, in typical cases of information or communication services, marginal
costs are a fraction of fixed costs (one may think of movies, software, financial and insurance services,
etc.). Commercial success seems to depend critically on the reaping of economies of scale, leaving
Europe with its fragmented national service markets and cultural diversity at a disadvantage.
4) In many ways, such views are reminiscent of the old Prebish-Singer dependencia arguments, but applied to the advanced
countries. In the old core-periphery models, "immiserising" growth in the developing countries would take place because all
the benefits of increased efficiency gains in raw materials, agricultural, and labour-intensive manufacturing production were
passed on to the advanced economies, e.g. through lower prices or higher repatriated profits. In the current view, the pattern
is the opposite: most of the benefits of technological change are passed on to some of the rapidly industrialising countries
through more rapid international diffusion of technology from the advanced countries, the reinvestment of profits and
relocation of production to those industrialising countries, and the erosion of various monopoly rents in the advanced
countries, including wages. In principle though, and in contrast to the Prebisch-Singer model, such a redistribution process
should lead, as trade theory would predict, to the convergence of growth and income and not to the "end of work". In this
regard, Hodgson (1999), provides an intriguing view on "why the learning economy is not the end of history".
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spotlight, despite the many reassuring historical arguments, and the macroeconomic success stories
of the United States and some of the smaller European countries. At the core of the current concerns
are the distributional aspects of ICT. Various skills, competences and qualifications are likely to be
of a much more pervasive and general nature, raising questions about the inherent "skill and
competence bias" of new ICT. Hence, we focus the remainder of this paper on the skill content of
recent technological change to evaluate those fears.
3. New technology and skills
In the previous section, we described how various forms of technological change could be connected
to changing employment structures; here we develop a story connecting ICT to the possibly (changing)
level of skill requirements (5). The idea is very straightforward. Suppose a technological revolution
takes place requiring the implementation of new equipment. This can only be successful if the labour
force can operate the new equipment, and so workers must acquire a set a "machine-specific" skills
(6). A technological revolution is "skill-biased" if the new skills are more costly to acquire than the skills
required to operate the old machine. On the other hand, it is "de-skilling" if the reverse is true.
Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), argue that 1974 is a turning point in the introduction of
Information Technology (IT) (7). From this year on, the rate of technological change in the
production of IT equipment increased. A sharp rise in the demand for skilled workers followed and
so did income inequality in many OECD countries. Table 1 gives an overview of the rise in income
inequality in OECD countries from the 1970s onwards.
The IF revolution is often
perceived as a skill biased
revolution.
From this evidence, the IT-revolution is often perceived as a skill-biased revolution, favouring the
labour-market position of the skilled part of the workforce at the expense of the unskilled. Several
studies find a substantial positive correlation between skill upgrading and computer investments,
employee computer use, and research and development efforts (8). For example. Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (1997, pp. 49-50), argue that:
"the adoption of new technologies involves a significant cost in terms of
learning and that skilled labour has an advantage at learning. Then the
advance in technology will be associated with an increase in the demand for
skill needed to implement it. Hence, the skill premium will rise and income
inequality will widen."
5) Acemoglu (2000), provides an overview of the effect of technological change on wage inequality and the demand for
labour. He argues for the United States that the behaviour of wages and the returns to schooling indicate that technological
change has been in favour of skilled workers since 1940. Chennells and Van Reenen (1999), and Sanders and Ter Weel
(2000), provide an overview of the micro-econometric evidence of more than 100 studies investigating the effects of skill-
biased technological change.
6) Much research has suggested that long-run changes in the distribution of earnings is shaped by a race between the
demand for skill, driven by industrial shifts and technological advances, and the supply of skills, altered by changes in
educational investments, demographics, and immigration. See, for example, Katz and Murphy (1992), Murphy and Welch
(1992), Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Acemoglu (1999), and Goldin and Katz (1999).
7) We prefer to use the term IT here as distinguished from ICT, which emphasizes more strongly the importance of
communication technologies, such as the Internet and broadband communication.
8) See Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), and Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Berman, Bound and Machin (1998), and
Machin and Van Reenen (1998).
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Canada 0 + +
Denmark •• 0/+
Finland - 0
France - -/+ +
Germany 0 -/O +
Italy - 0
Japan •• +
Netherlands 0 -/+ 0
Norway •• 0
Portugal •• +
Spain --/O + +
Sweden 0 0/+
United Kingdom - ++ +/-
United States + ++ +/-
Note: ++: strong increase in dispersion, +: increase in dispersion, 0: no clear change, -: decrease in
dispersion, -: strong decrease in dispersion, +/-: increase followed by decrease, ..: no information available.
Source: Sanders and Ter Weel (2000)
Similarly, Caselli (1999, pp. 79-80) argues that:
"technological progress has been predominantly incremental in the 1950s
and 1960s, and predominantly revolutionary (of the skill-biased variety) in the
1970s and 1980s."
The main example of IT-investment is, of course, the computer. An eminent paper by Krueger (1993),
on the impact of computer usage on wages and the demand for skilled workers, shows (for 1984
and 1989), that workers using a computer receive a wage premium of some 15 percent. Later work
by Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), shows that this computer wage premium has increased to more
than 20 percent in 1993. In interpreting his findings, Krueger (p. 34) concludes that
"employees who use computers at work earn more as a result of applying
their computer skills."
Based on the argument that workers who are best at using the computer are allotted to jobs, which
require these skills most, other researchers also conclude that computer skills have a high pay off (9).
This evidence suggest that IT would be a truly skill-biased "revolution" increasing the demand for
high-level (computer) skills and leading to persistent wage inequality between workers possessing
computer skills, and the rest.
9) See for example Entorfand Kramarz (1997), and Miller and Mulvey (1997).
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However, there is also evidence suggesting that IT has not changed the labour market as
dramatically as sketched above. For example, the previous argumentation requires that the highest
skilled workers have been allotted to the most complex jobs. Many authors therefore conclude that
workers using a computer are most qualified to do so. Thus, a major part of the increase in the
demand for skilled workers and wage differences can be attributed to the emergence of the
computer. The policy solution seems obvious. Education should focus on teaching computer skills
much more than it has done so far. This analysis reflects a view on computers that is now popular
amongst businessmen and policy makers. Indeed, many people take the odd computer course to
familiarise themselves with Windows or the Internet, afraid to lose touch with it all. They often buy
a computer to ensure that their children become familiar with the new technology. Policy measures
are based on the assumption that all youngsters need to enter the labour market with computer
skills, because otherwise there might be a threat of an unbridgeable computer skill gap, the source
of a digital divide in society.
Recent research by Borghans and Ter Weel (2000b), however, has illustrated the major
shortcomings of such a view. From various perspectives, research results are found that do not fit in
this framework (10). They are:
1. The largest premium for e-mail and word processing
If one takes a close look at Krueger's results, it appears that the largest computer wage premium
goes to computer tasks such as e-mailing and word processing. These are hardly the skills that
are reserved for the higher educated. Surprisingly enough, tasks that are carried out by
computer programmers and specialist staff, such as software design, are rewarded with lower
computer wage premiums.
2. Many low and intermediately skilled workers use computers
As many low-skilled and intermediately skilled workers use computers, Bresnahan (1999), and
Handel (1999), argue that it is unlikely that they are the cause of skill-biased technical change.
In particular, many typists use e-mail and word-processing intensively. This does not seem to
indicate that the use of new technology requires sophisticated skills.
3. Is it true that computer usage leads to higher wages?
Chennells and Van Reenen (1998), and Entorf, Gollac and Kramarz (1999), studied a data set
of employees who started to use computers. They found that they did not receive significantly
higher wages than the group who did not use computers.
4. Companies with a high level of computer usage also pay higher wages to employees
who do not use computers
The idea that the computer wage premium should first and foremost be regarded as an
appreciation of individual computer skills, implies that only those who actually use a computer
will get higher wages. However, studies by Doms, Dunne and Troske (1997), and Dunne, Foster,
Haltiwanger and Troske (2000), show that the computer wage premium is not an individual, but
a company-related effect. They found that companies that work with advanced technology, such
as computers, pay their employees more. It is irrelevant whether an employee uses a computer
or not. He/she will nevertheless receive a wage premium.
10) See Borghans and Ter Weel (2000c), for an elaborate overview of these arguments.
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If computer skills are becoming more and more important in the labour market and increasing
use of computers has made these skills a scarce commodity, it can be expected that employers
will try to ensure that anyone who has such skills does work in areas where these are important.
DiNardo and Pischke (1996), however, show that in Germany it is by no means the case that
all those who have computer skills, are working in jobs in which computers are used.
6. The use of pencils also yields a premium
DiNardo and Pischke (1997), took a critical look at Krueger's results by investigating whether it
was only computer usage that explained remarkable wage differences. They therefore looked at
the use of other tools, such as pencils, calculators, telephones, and whether a person works
standing up or sitting down, to see whether any of these aspects could also explain the wage
differences. Apart from the computer wage premium, they found a similarly large premium for
the use of pencils. From these results, they concluded that Krueger's computer wage premium is
probably not an adequate measure for the importance of computer skills.
7. Rewards appear to be unrelated to computer skills
The six types of research results discussed above all cast doubt on the question whether the
computer wage premium should be interpreted as a reward for computer skills. The questions
that they raise, however, are always based on indirect evidence. One of the few studies based
on direct measures of computer skills, by Borghans and Ter Weel (2000a), using evidence from
a survey carried out in the United Kingdom in 1997, groups people by computer skills (from
very high to very low). It turns out that everyone appears to receive approximately the same
computer wage premium (see Table 2). As a matter of fact, individuals with average computer
skills receive the highest computer wage premium.
An important observation




of IT in the workplace.
The above seven points question the traditional view that IT skills - limited here to computer skills -
are highly rewarded, and that simply operating computers requires special and more highly paid
skills. How then can one explain the impact of computers on the composition of skills and the labour
force? The most insightful contribution is by Bresnahan (1999), who offers a theory of workplace
computerisation focusing on computer use in white-collar bureaucracies, the substitution of machine
decision-making for human decision-making in low-skilled white-collar work, and the strategic use
of computers by high-skilled workers. Autor, Levy and Murnane (2000), further develop the
argument by modelling how the widespread adoption of computers in the workplace might alter
skill demands. They argue that not all tasks are equally amenable to computerisation and that
computers are an incomplete substitute for both unskilled and skilled labour. Their empirical results
suggest that computerisation is associated with a declining demand for routine manual and
information processing skills and a rising demand for non-routine information processing skills.
An important observation is that high wages themselves are an important factor in explaining the
introduction of IT at the workplace, because the savings are in this case much greater. Hence, IT
use is determined by a combination of the specific tasks of a job and the wage level of a particular
worker. As a consequence, when new IT-applications are developed and costs decrease, IT spreads
further both among relatively skilled and unskilled workers.
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Computer skills Estimated computer wage premium
(standard error in brackets)




Very Low .308 (.135)
Note: The following equation was estimated: In Wl = Xfi. + C,-b + e(- where In Wt is the natural logarithm
of the hourly wages of individual i, X( is a vector of the observed personal characteristics of individual i,
such as training level, age, working experience, etc. C,- is a matrix for the different levels of importance of
computer skills, a and b are estimated parameters, e,- is an error term with the usual assumptions. The
equation was estimated using OLS.
Source: Borghans and Ter Weel (2000a)
4. The skill content of recent technological change
The above discussion suggests that the complementarity between ICT and skilled workers is one
possible scenario but not the only one. It might also be the case that due to the costs of ICT it is
more profitable to start implementing ICT at the highest (wage) segment of the labour market. By
eliminating routine tasks, the computer gives more time to workers to use their particular skills.
But how does Europe compare in terms of education and skills, and what is the impact of skill
differentials on wages?
Internationally comparable databases are scarce because of measurement problems in comparing
educational levels. For example, on-thejob training traditions in some countries (notably Germany
and Sweden) make education a biased estimator, the United Kingdom has a complex educational
system depending upon profession, and the high-school-college system in the United States is again
different. One database in which we are able to compare skills on an international level is the
International Adult Literary Survey (IALS) conducted by the OECD and Statistics Canada in 1995 (11).
The main advantage of IALS is that between 2 000 and 4 500 individuals in each of seven
countries have been asked exactly the same questions (12). In this way, a relatively consistent
picture of the skills of the workforce in these countries has been obtained. Besides the information
on literacy, the survey also included questions on standard labour market variables such as
employment status, earnings, education and demographic characteristics. In this section we only
use data for males aged 18-65 years who were employed at the moment of the interview.
We distinguish five different skill measures: years of schooling, on-thejob work experience,
numerical literacy, prose literacy, and document literacy. The first two skills do not need further
11) For more details on the data used here see the descriptive sections in Murray, Kirsch and Jenkins (1998) and Leuven,
Oosterbeek and Van Ophem (2000).
12) These countries are Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and the United States. France
took part initially, but subsequently withdrew its support.
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to apply arithmetic operations to numbers embedded in printed materials, such as balancing a
check book, figuring out a tip, completing an order form, or determining the interest on a loan from
an advertisement. Prose literacy is the knowledge needed to understand and use information from
texts including editorials, news stories, poems and fiction. Finally, document literacy is defined as
the knowledge required to locate and use information contained in various formats, including job
applications, payroll forms, transportation schedules, maps, tables and graphics, etc.
In Table 3 we show the mean and standard deviation of the test scores for each country (13). For
ease of comparison we have put the United States' scores at 100 for each of the five skill measures.
It is clear that - although the standard deviations are very large - average years of schooling is
highest in the United States. Germany and Sweden are at the lower end, which might reflect the
fact that they have many apprenticeships often not regarded as formal schooling. Indeed, the
European countries all have relatively higher average rates of on-thejob work experience.








































































































Note: For employed males aged 18-65 years. The scores are all indices relative to the United States, i.e. the
United States is set at 100 in each column. The first observation in each column is the mean of the score, and
the term in brackets is the standard deviation. N in column (2) is the number of observation available. See
Murray, Kirsch and Jenkins (1998), for further details.
13) The intuition behind investigating the standard deviation besides the mean is straightforward. When the distribution has
"thick tails" we expect the standard deviation to be large, i.e. there are many people at both ends of the distribution and
not so many close to the mean. If, on the other hand, the distribution is fairly "normal" we do not expect the standard
deviation to be very large.
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The scores for the three dimension of literacy are displayed in columns 5 to 7 of the Table. It turns
out that Sweden has the highest relative scores in all three categories. The EU countries are above
the scores of the United States for numerical and document literacy, but may perform less well for
prose literacy. However, the large standard deviations prevent us from drawing strong conclusions
from these three columns.
To say something about the importance of skills within countries, we look at the distribution of these
skills. Table 4 computes the difference between the 90th and 10th percentile of the skill distribution.
The United States is interesting in this regard in that it has the lowest differential for education (both
for years of schooling and work experience), but a larger gap in terms of skills (only Poland
performs worse). The question these data raise is whether wage inequalities across countries also
reflect these differentials?





































































This issue is further explored in Box 1 with a regression of wages on education (schooling and one-
thejob training) and literacy. The interesting feature is the significance that numerical, prose, and
document literacy has in determining wages. High returns to these "cognitive" skills have also been
underscored by Murnane, Willett and Levy (1995). It applies to persons of all educational levels,
showing that a rising demand for basic cognitive skills might be part of the explanation for the rise
in wage inequality in the United States since the 1980s.
Returning to the question of the consequences of the computer on labour markets, these results seem
in-line with Bresnahan's (1999), observation that ICT has not been a substitute for high levels of
human cognitive skills. As ICT applications take over work from human beings, the importance of
various types of skills will undergo major changes in the near future. On the basis of the new
production options, employers will reconsider the product range that their companies supply and
the working methods used. Under certain circumstances, we expect that there will be more tailor-
made work (in those occupations where skills are required) while under other conditions there will
be greater standardisation of products (in less skill-intensive jobs).
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Since there is no direct information on wages in the published version of the IALS, we have to rely on
estimates by Leuven, Oosterbeek and Van Ophem (2000), who had access to the wage information
before publication, and on other sources. Table 1.1 shows the summary measures of wage inequality
for the countries of the IALS.
When we look at the information available over time - and acknowledging that the data are drawn from
different sources - we can see that inequality has widened in Canada and Europe. Typically the
differential between the 90th and 10th percentile of the wage distribution increased by about 18
percent or so between the late 1980s and mid-1990s. In the United States this ratio is significantly
larger, but it increases by only a small amount over this particular period.
Another observation from Table 1.1 is the fact that for some countries the difference between the 90th
- 50th percentile of the wage distribution is larger than the 50th - 10th percentile. This indicates that
there is larger dispersion towards the top of the wage distribution. These countries are Germany, the
Netherlands (1987), Poland, Sweden (1980 and 1992), and Switzerland. On the other hand, there
are also countries in which the difference between the 50th - 10th percentile of the wage distribution is
larger than the 90th - 50th percentile. This indicates that workers at the lower end of the wage
distribution earn relatively little. These countries include Canada, the Netherlands (1995), Sweden
(1995), and the United States.































































































Note: Authors: B&K: Blau and Kahn (1996, Figure 1), G&J: Gottschalk and Joyce (1998, Table 1), and
LO&VO: Leuven, Oosterbeek and Van Ophem (2000, Table 3).
Table 1.2 takes these comparisons further. It gives the results of the following wage regression for each of
the seven countries (taken from Leuven, Oosterbeek and Van Ophem, 2000, Table 4):
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where \nW is the log of the wage, SCH is years of schooling, EXP is on-thejob work experience,
IALS is a simple arithmetic average of the scores on three measures of literacy, INDIOCC are
industry and occupational dummies, C is constant and £, is an error term with the usual properties.
The results of this simple exercise are as follows: First, there are large differences in the returns to
schooling. For example, one year of additional education pays under 3 percent of additional wage in
the EU, while it pays close to 5 percent in the United States, and as much as 9 percent in Poland.
Many scholars have attributed the high returns to education in the United States to skill-biased technical
change (see, for example, Katz and Murphy (1992). Columns (3) and (4) of the Table reflect the returns
to on-thejob work experience. The coefficient is highest in Switzerland and lowest in Sweden and the
United States. In all countries workers face decreasing returns to experience (EXP^/IQQ is negative
and significant in all instances). However, on-thejob work experience is probably not a very good
measure for skills and these results should be interpreted with caution.
The most interesting column is column (5), the return on literacy. This is highest in the United States.
Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland also show relatively large wage premiums. Surprisingly,
the coefficient is insignificant in Poland and Sweden. This could be interpreted to mean that these skills
do not give workers a wage premium in those countries.

















































































Note: Dependent variable log wage; standard error in brackets. ** is significant at a 1 percent level
and * is significant at a 5 percent level.
Source: Leuven, Oosterbeek and Van Ophem (2000, Table 4)




many secondary tasks can
be taken over by the new
technology.
Thus, a major effect of greater penetration of ICT is that individuals at work are able to concentrate
more on those activities that constitute the essence of their profession. Many secondary tasks will
be taken over by the new technology. This means that employers will tend to increase skill
requirements. After all, the costs of higher wages will be compensated by the fact that less time is
lost on tasks in which these skills are not used. It is in particular this argument that gives rise to the
expectation that the demand for higher educated workers will continue to grow. As a result the
computerisation of the labour market may then in effect lead to "skill-biased technical change".
5. Concluding comments
The particular employment concerns associated with ICT investment relate ultimately to their likely
impact on output and productivity growth and wage premium redistribution across educational and
skill levels. We have in this paper focused very much on these latter aspects, highlighting some of
the complexities currently involved and insufficiently captured in the simple dichotomy of "skill-
biased" versus "de-skilling" revolutions. Let us conclude with some general observations with
respect to the growth and productivity impacts.
In attempting to assess the overall employment creation and destruction effects of ICT it is not
possible to distinguish the direct negative and positive effects from the indirect effects, if ever this
was possible in the past. The direct effects represent as much the new jobs in producing and
delivering new products and services, as the old jobs being replaced by new ICT equipment. The
indirect effects are the amalgamation of the many positive and negative consequences elsewhere.
Thus, while computer terminals are everywhere, it is not always clear whether they are displacing
workers or adding additional services and employment (14). The computer industry itself has
provided machines that displaced earlier types of electromechanical office equipment, while the
microelectronic industry largely displaced the old valve (tube) industry.
Such arguments do not hold only for manufacturing. In services too, it is no longer possible to
distinguish clearly direct from indirect employment creation of displacement effects. New digital
telephone exchanges require far less labour to manufacture and to maintain than the old
electromechanical exchanges and the number of people working in the telephone switch industry
has fallen in most industrial countries. Competitive re-structuring of the old monopolistic networks
has also resulted in a reduction of the number of employers, even though the number of firms and
the number of lines and cells has increased. However, and contrary to initial expectations, the new
telecommunication infrastructure provided the basis for many new information service industries,
bringing about a significant employment growth rather than the predicted employment loss.
Similarly, some of the main ICT-using service sectors, such as financial services and insurances
witnessed overall little employment displacement. However, within these sectors a significant
restructuring took place amongst differentjobs. That restructuring process is far from over. It is likely
to be followed in the years to come by a significant employment displacement of clerical "physical
presence" jobs in many local branches of banks, insurance offices, even call centres as such jobs
are further "automated" through computers and through virtual communication on the Internet. The
14) See Autor, Levy and Murnane (2000) who analyse job creation and destruction in a large US bank following the
introduction of an automated cheque processing system. They find it hard to distinguish whether changes took place within
the job, or whether new jobs were created as a result of this particular technological change.
146 Volume 6 No 1 2001unexpected, positive employment trends in these sectors is hence no basis for any prediction of
future trends.
To compare the sector balance of gains and losses remains therefore an impossible undertaking as
numerous empirical studies of the 1980s and 1990s already confirmed (e.g. Davis, Haltiwanger
and Schuh, 1996). What is for sure is that an aggregate output growth which lies - as has been
the case over the last decades in a number of OECD countries such as the United States, the
Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom - substantially above productivity growth
will lead to significant declines in unemployment rates, employment growth being sufficient to
absorb both new entrants to the labour market and reabsorb displaced workers. As a matter of fact,
in the 1990s some of these countries witnessed a significant growth in labour force participation,
which itself has been a source of additional growth. Many of those new entrants (women and youth)
having relatively high consumption patterns in some of the new ICT areas (mobile communication.
Internet use, etc.). All this makes it difficult to argue what the true domestic employment effects of
technological change are.
What can be argued nevertheless is that ICT investment's impact on growth depends in the first
instance on the new needs and markets the new information service sectors are capable of
addressing. In Europe this has been aptly illustrated by the phenomenal rise in mobile telephony
use. Whether the recently tendered frequencies for third generation mobile communication (UMTS)
will lead to a similar uptake of mobile Internet use remains to be seen, but will again depend
crucially on the way telecom operators succeed in identifying possible core "new" mobile needs.
The information and communication technologies have undoubtedly opened a new dimension of
business and consumer wants. Such new demand led growth does not seem, at least in these early
stages of the information communication revolution, to be subject to intrinsic demand satiation
effects, as in the case of previous manufacturing consumer needs. Nevertheless, Gordon (2000),
has argued that the new information and communication technologies represent ultimately little
more than increased substitution possibilities of "free time" ultimately constrained by "the fixed
endowment of human time". That might well be so, but such increased substitution possibilities do
open up possibilities for an infinity of alternative, individual consumption activities, unlikely to be
ever subject to demand satiation. The spectre of "technological unemployment" resulting from
demand satiation seems from this perspective more than ever unrealistic.
Demand for skilled labour
has undoubtedly risen,
But it is not computer skills
that are behind the
widening of wage
differentials: it is the
freeing of time so that
more skilled workers can
get on with their job.
With respect to the distributional aspects of ICT, the demand for skilled labour and in particular the
highly specialised IT jobs, has undoubtedly risen relative to the demand for unskilled labour.
However, it does not appear to be computer skills per se are behind the widening of wage
inequality over the past two decades. Rather the effect of the computer on which we focused in
Sections 3 and 4 appears in essence to consist of the freeing of time so that more skilled workers
can get on with the core tasks of their job. In this sense computer skills have become pervasive,
truly general purpose skills widely used across all skills and all jobs. The freeing of time in the case
of the more expensive, skilled work force has not only led to a more rapid diffusion of computer
use amongst this particular group of the work force, it has also induced employers to hire more
skilled workers.
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